In this paper I discuss the meaning of the theory of conversational philosophy. I show that its background inspiration is derived from an under-explored African notion of relationship or communion or interdependence. I argue that conversational philosophy forms a theoretic framework on which most ethical, metaphysical and epistemological discourses in African philosophy-and by African philosophers-could be grounded.
Introduction
There was a time, during the early period in the history of African philosophy, when some actors-specifically those now categorised as ethno-philosophers-thought that the practice of African philosophy was something that ought not to extend beyond Africa both in focus and in agency (cf. Kagame 1956; Keita 1991; Mbiti 1969) . Incidentally, that consciousness has been seriously challenged and rendered obsolete by those now categorised as members of the universal school (cf. Bodunrin 1984; Hountondji 1996; Wiredu 1980) . The erroneous idea that African philosophy is a culture-bound enterprise has since given way to a more charitable conception of African philosophy as a field motivated in a place but transcending the place.
In the recent time, a handful of theories have been articulated and a host of concepts formulated in African philosophy. Some of these include the modern revival of ubuntu thought, especially by philosophers in southern Africa. However, the majority of ideas have emerged from West Africa. The list includes: Kwasi Wiredu's Conceptual Decolonisation (1995) ; Pantaleon Iroegbu's Uwa Ontology (1995) ; Inoccent Asouzu's Ibuanyidanda Ontology (2004) ; Ifeanyi Menkiti's Afro-Communitarianism (1984) ; and a host of others.
Some impressive ideas have also emerged from East Africa, notably, Odera Oruka's Human Minimum (1989 /1997 and others. Indeed, the list is long, but gazetting these ideas is not my main purpose here. What I rather want to show is that despite the obvious universal applicability of these ideas, their formulations were not intended to galvanise support for a cross-border engagement. One could, therefore, say that these ideas were articulated for discussions within the frame of African philosophy. But this is the challenge because philosophy should never be exhausted within the encounters of a given place. It is not supposed to be a place thing alone; it is also an inter-place activity.
The reason why philosophy in our time ought to be an inter-place activity as well, is because different cultures are fast attaining intellectual maturation. Reason, which is the driver of philosophic thought, first exerted a centrifugal force on itself; which saw it self-divide into many units and manifest these units in different human cultures. The development of various human cultures can be likened to the maturation of these units of reason, culminating in the emergence of different philosophy traditions. But this reason is somewhat restless. As it matures in different cultures, it is bound to exert yet another force on itself; this time the centripetal force in order to unite these different manifestations of itself to the centre. This is the great movement of philosophy from the peripheries to the centre. We may call this destination intercultural philosophy. Part of my goal in this work is to demonstrate how African philosophy, as a cultural particular, makes this journey. Different philosophy traditions may have different ideas of what counts as viable ideas in philosophy, this does not subtract from the quality of philosophy they do. However, it is only those traditions that are truly rigorous that can transform their discourse from the periphery to the centre. I have no doubt that intercultural philosophy is the future philosophy. It seems inevitable that someday, philosophy in various traditions must converge to live out the destiny of reason-a coming together of all. African philosophy, therefore, must show its stamina to thrive both within its geography and beyond. In this work, I will employ the theory of conversational philosophy as an index in African philosophy to demonstrate this. I will discuss conversational philosophy as a theory, outlining some of its principles and claims. Thereafter I explore conversational philosophy as a method of thought called conversationalism, focusing on its potentials as an unbranded mechanism for studying reality. I will show-using conversational philosophy as an index-that African philosophy as a tradition is capable of crossing borders and reaching the goal of intercultural philosophy. The article is concluded by highlighting intercultural philosophy as the future philosophy.
The Theory of Conversational Philosophy
A number of scholars are associated with the development of this train of thought, known as conversational philosophy (CP) in African philosophy. Some of the seminal ideas can be found in the works of those who call themselves members of the Conversational School of Philosophy (CSP) (see Chimakonam 2014 Chimakonam , 2015a Chimakonam , 2015b Chimakonam , 2015c Edet 2016; Nweke 2015 Nweke , 2016 (Chimakonam 2015b, 19; 2015a, 463) .
However, the notion of "conversational philosophy" was first used by Richard Rorty in
Western philosophy (Rorty 2007, 120-130) . According to Rorty (2007, 124) , conversational philosophy is a substitute name for continental philosophy. Rorty suggests this name change in order to end the undue cultural conflict between the analytic and the continental traditions among Western premier universities, where the structuring of philosophy curricula along the line of one or the other has restricted the depth of philosophy education. As he put it: "I suggest we drop the term 'continental' and instead contrast analytic philosophy with conversational philosophy" (Rorty 2007, 124 This is all about a problem of method. Some thinkers have drawn attention to the danger of universalising the cultural particular of a given tradition of philosophy (see Dussel 1985; Hebga 1958; Janz 2009; Serequeberhan 1991) .
To overcome this challenge for intercultural philosophy, I formulate an intercultural method called conversationalism, which is divested of any form of cultural centrism. At the intercultural arena, actors from different places would be required to employ the same method in evaluating the ethical, epistemological and metaphysical assumptions of others.
This supplies the much needed balance and epistemic justice sorely lacking in the intercultural literature out there. Only in following this conversational strategy, or any other like it, can we say we have begun a true intercultural discourse.
The idea of conversational thinking begins from the premise that philosophy has many traditions conditioned by different cultures that inspired them, but that it is possible for these traditions to get involved in a relationship of a kind that I have described as the Global Expansion of Thought (GET) (Chimakonam 2015a, 466-468) . This is what some people There are two main inspirations behind the concept of conversational philosophy. The first is the under-explored notion of relationship found mainly among the various sub-Saharan
African peoples. The second is the root word arụmarụ-ụka, derived from the Igbo language spoken by well over seventy million people whose ancestral land lies in the West-African country of Nigeria, east of the Niger River. To the first, the idea of relationship or communion or mutual interdependence is something that speaks to our best human ideals. We want to belong to a common unit; we want to be loved, helped and protected by others.
Interestingly, it seems more research is being done on this notion of relationship in the recent time by African thinkers. Scholars like Pantaleon Iroegbu (1995) and Innocent Asouzu socio-political theories of individual-community interaction. Thaddeus Metz (2011 Metz ( , 2013 Metz ( , 2015a Metz ( , 2015b Metz ( , 2017 , specifically, has exploited it in developing what he calls an African theory of relational ethics. In southern Africa, several scholars working on ubuntu thought have also appealed to this notion in developing various strands of ubuntu ontology and ethics.
A few to mention include: Mogobe Ramose (2005) , Leonhard Praeg (2014) and Fainos Mangena (2016) . It is possible that scholars from other places like Asia, South America and even Europe are also thinking within this concept. The point I want to make is that the notion of relationship speaks to some of our best human ideals, whether in Africa, or Europe, or Asia, or America, or anywhere-there are human communities.
The second inspiration, arụmarụ-ụka, will be discussed in the next section when I unfold the methodical ambience of the theory of conversational thinking. On the whole, due to the cultural moorings of diverse philosophy traditions, it makes practical sense to weave a universal method for intercultural philosophy. I will seek to do so from using the notion of relationship which, as I have explained, is something that cuts across quite a number of cultures in the world. Explicating this method shall be the focus of next section.
The Method of Conversationalism
As universal as this notion of relationship could be in philosophical thinking, it does appear that adequate attempt is yet to be made, to the best of my knowledge, to formulate a method of thought from it. It would, therefore, not be out of place to attempt to systematise the idea of relationship into a method of philosophising and intercultural philosophy specifically. Oruka did with his famous theory of philosophic sagacity. 3 Here, I deal with the "concept" conversationalism and not the "word" conversation.
The idea of conversationalism traces back to the Igbo notion of "arụmarụ-ụka," which roughly translates to: "engaging in critical and creative conversation." This notion has two senses; 1) as a noun, "the act" (but not the state) of engaging in critical and creative conversation; and 2) as a noun, "the mechanism" for engaging in critical and creative conversation. Both senses of the word describe a form of critical and creative relationship between or among parties. If we anglicise the word, the adjective "arumaristic" may be derived to qualify any relationship that is characterised by any of the two senses of the word above. And from this adjective, the noun "arumaristics" may be coined to describe a procedure for reasoning in which thesis and anti-thesis complement rather than conflate and maintain their individualities in order to frustrate the emergence of synthesis. It is from the English translation as "conversation" that the concept conversationalism-as a description of the method-is adopted.
As a method, conversationalism is a formal procedure for assessing the relationships of There are a few things that are worth noting in the conversational type of engagement. First, conversational relationship is not a dialectic relationship in which components of thesis and anti-thesis come together to form the synthesis. It is rather an arumaristic relationship in which the struggle between thesis and anti-thesis is not between two competing positions, which culminates in the emergence of a new position (synthesis). In an arumaristic relationship there is only one position at a time and the party that holds and defends it is called nwa-nsa, as already stated. The philosophic duty of the rival party, called nwa-nju, is to question the viability of that position within the framework of conversationalism in order to reveal its loopholes and creatively fill up the lacunas. Thus, while conversationalism promises a certain degree of epistemological alignment between two seemingly opposed variables, fundamental differences will always persist due to opposing ontological loyalties of the variables. This perpetuates the reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis and frustrates the emergence of synthesis initially expected.
Second, in a conversational relationship, thesis does not emerge out of the womb of synthesis; it is re-invented by nwa-nsa. The incessant questioning by nwa-nju compels nwansa to do constant evaluation of his position in light of new ideas and where necessary, he makes needful re-adjustments to his position. This is, in my estimation, a procedure that accounts for knowledge growth and intellectual progress. What happens in a relationship between X and Y within the framework of conversational thinking can be described as complementation rather than synthesis. Both complement themselves in that while the one needs the other to re-invent itself at a higher level of discourse, the other needs the one to fulfil its philosophic duty. In the end, what happens is a continuous progress in thought. They do not reach a compromise by contributing components towards the formation of a new order-this is what synthesis is about in a dialectic relationship.
Third, in a conversational relationship, the thesis has a transgenerational life-span. It keeps being re-invented and grows in sophistication, unlike in a dialectic relationship where the life-span of a thesis is generational. It fizzles out in each generation allowing room for the emergence of another thesis to take its place.
Further, having discussed the concept of arumaristics, I want to enunciate two main principles of conversationalism, namely: 1) conversational thinking as multicultural; and 2) conversational thinking as transcultural.
1. The first is that the method of conversationalism is necessarily multicultural. It implies that there is room for every culture. Philosophy in our time has to cross borders. One fundamental thing that will keep philosophy relevant in this Age, and probably for all time to come, is the idea of "relationship. Kimmerle insists "that philosophy must either become intercultural, or else become nothing more than an academic preoccupation void of societal relevance" (Kimmerle 1994, 31) .
2. The second is that the method of conversationalism necessarily has to be transcultural.
Here, we simply mean the idea of one seeing itself in the other or, one transcending its cultural centrism in judging, willing and acting towards the other and vice versa. In conversational thinking, there is no hegemony or lop-sidedness of the superior/inferior type. If we are to have a philosophy of the future-the type which Michel Foucault (1999) talks about when he discusses the crisis of Western thought as being identical to the end of imperialism-then, the West must find a way to set aside their cultural centrism, which fuels the crisis of thought in Europe, and think of the transcultural ideals of tolerance, equity, justice and complementarity. Foucault eminently declares the crisis of Western thought as the end of the era of Western philosophy. He predicts that if philosophy of the future exists, it must be born outside Europe (Foucault 1999, 113) . Conversational philosophy, which promotes the ideals of intercultural discourse, may have been born outside Europe but it is by no means Afrocentrist. In fact, one reason why it is born outside Europe is because the notion of relationship which undergirds it, is receiving the most philosophical attention in African philosophy at the moment, as indicated earlier. It is in this connection that Heinz Kimmerle (1994, 31) explains that "the philosophical contribution to a renegotiation of the relationship between cultures is decisive for the status of philosophy today." The conversational strategy of philosophy which is culturally unbranded may, therefore, be one narrow path into the future of philosophy as a discipline undergoing new evolution. It would not be out of place to say that this new, if you like, cosmopolitan presentation of philosophy, is set to position philosophy as a rainbow discipline.
In the next section, I will go beyond the territory of African philosophy and focus on bringing out the intercultural dimension of conversational philosophy.
Conversational Philosophy in and Beyond African Philosophy
Conversational philosophy is not only effective within a pre-defined border like the African philosophy geography; I have demonstrated its capacity to also cross borders and drive the promise of intercultural philosophy. A few important questions that must be asked as we think about the prospects of intercultural philosophy are: Do we take our methods with us when we cross borders? Or: Do we weave different methods from different traditions together? Or: Do we formulate a custom method for intercultural engagements? In a true intercultural philosophy, the answer to the initial two questions would be a definite "no!"
When we take the methods of our particular places into a multi-cultural setting, cultural hegemony of some sort is likely to arise. Also, we may fall into the error of measuring the thoughts of the other with the wrong instrument. Additionally, to synthesise competing methods is a bad logical idea. Therefore, we are left with the option of formulating a new, has oscillated between one rationality and many. In the last couple of decades, however, three names have stood out as the noisiest advocates of intercultural discourse, namely: Heinz Kimmerle (1994); Franz Wimmer (1996 and Ram Adhar Mall (2000a , 2000b , 2015 .
Despite their stellar contributions to the development of intercultural philosophy as a bourgeoning academic field, there is one thing at which they all failed. In their architectonic structure of intercultural philosophy they paid little attention to the question of choice of method. They assumed quite in error that all that was needed to have an intercultural discourse was the coming together of different traditions of philosophy. While Kimmerle and
Mall posit dialogue as the veritable method of such discourse, Wimmer opted for polylogue.
In the end, they all failed to see the challenge of conceptual impositions or epistemic hegemony that might arise if we crossed borders with the methods developed in our particular places. This constitutes the core of Asouzu's criticism of Kimmerle and the rest who are at the forefront of intercultural philosophy (Asouzu 2007b, 24-42) . This insightful vision of the necessity of a custom method for intercultural philosophy was not lost to me; hence I advocate a procedure known as conversationalism. There should neither be veneration nor uncritical presuppositions. Intercultural philosophers owe one another the duty to assess, examine, question and pass epistemic judgements on the ideas which other cultural places have expressed. 4) The third stage is conversation:
intercultural encounter is not completed or exhausted in one expressing their ideas and interpreting the ideas expressed by others, Each side also has to engage the other on one key front, for example, K has to further engage J on J's interpretation of K and vice versa. In other words, there necessarily has to be a critical and creative encounter in order to unveil new concepts and open new thought vistas. This is the actual conversation, and the platform for this engagement necessarily has to be balanced, equal, fair and just to all. 5) Besides the three stages, there are the legal parameters. There are rules of engagement in intercultural discourse. The first is that a true intercultural engagement has to be cross-cultural, i.e. not only crossing borders but involving as many cultures of philosophy as are available. The second rule is that it has to be transcultural, i.e. transcending particular centrist visions. The third is the rule of mutual respect, i.e. one must not express itself as an absolute instance or attempt to universalise its particular. The fourth rule is the principle of charity, i.e. one must not interpret the other's perspective as inferior or subordinated or interpret itself as superior and dominant.
On the whole, if any one of these conditions is not met, it is hard for there to be a true intercultural engagement. This is because the goal of intercultural philosophy, which is to orchestrate a centripetal movement of reason from its different cultural manifestations in order to restore the unity of thought, would have been defeated.
Conclusion
This paper explored conversational philosophy as a theory in African philosophy. I brought out its methodic trajectory, discussed some of its principles and showed its theoretic 
